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ABSTRACT.  This paper introduces time-tradeoff (TTO) sequences as a new tool to 
analyze time inconsistency and intertemporal choice.  TTO sequences simplify the 
measurement of discount functions, requiring no assumption about utility.  They also 
simplify the qualitative testing of time inconsistencies, and allow for quantitative 
measurements thereof.  TTO sequences can easily be administered using only pencil 
and paper.  They readily show which subjects are most prone to time inconsistencies. 
We further use them to axiomatically analyze and empirically test (quasi-)hyperbolic 
discount functions.  An experiment demonstrates the feasibility of measuring TTO 
sequences.  Our data falsify (quasi-)hyperbolic discount functions and call for the 
development of models that can accommodate increasing impatience. 
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1. Introduction 
 Time inconsistency occurs if agents deviate from the plans they preferred a priori 
when offered the possibility to revise at the moment of actual choice.  Strotz (1956) 
was the first to analyze the implications of time inconsistency in an economic model.  
It has since been well understood that time inconsistency lies at the heart of many 
economic phenomena.  Time inconsistencies may arise due to changing preferences of 
agents (Phelps and Pollak 1968; Strotz 1956).  Such changes in preferences can be 
modelled as strategic interactions between different selves within one agent (Asheim 
1997; Peleg and Yaari 1973).  They underly anomalies such as procrastination, 
temptation, and addiction.  There is a close connection between time (in)consistency 
and (violations of) Samuelson’s (1937) constant discount model.  Because of the 
many empirical violations of constant discounting (Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O'Donoghue 2002), Phelps and Pollak (1968) and others introduced alternative, 
hyperbolic, discount models.   
 Laibson (1997, 1998) demonstrated the importance of hyperbolic discounting for 
economics.  He showed that hyperbolic discounting provides an explanation for many 
observed phenomena, such as the drop in consumption at retirement, the holding of 
illiquid assets, the extensive credit card borrowing, and undersaving.  Present-biased 
hyperbolic discounters will want to pre-commit their future selves if they know that 
their future preferences will also be present-biased.  Illiquid assets can serve as a pre-
commitment device.  Thus, hyperbolic discounters will have a higher tendency to 
invest in illiquid assets than constant discounters will.  Agents with present-biased 
preferences will also want their future selves to save more than their future selves will 
actually want, which results in less savings than the agent would have liked after all.  
Time inconsistencies arising from present-biased preferences are  central in many 
papers (Akerlof 1991, 2002; Angeletos et al. 2001; Asheim 1997; Barro 1999; 
DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004;Gul and Pesendorfer 2005; Harris and Laibson 
2001; Krusell and Smith 2003; Luttmer and Mariotti 2003; O’Donoghue and Rabin 
1999a, 1999b; Thaler and Benartzi 2004).  Time inconsistencies may also arise in 
strategic situations when agents make incredible threats and do not follow a subgame 
perfect equilibrium. This is central in the determination of monetary policies, for 
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instance (Kydland and Prescott 1977).  In this paper we focus on time inconsistencies 
arising from changing preferences.   
  We start by introducing a general tool to facilitate the study of intertemporal 
choice.  Our tool is especially suited to quantitatively measure the extent to which an 
agent is vulnerable to time inconsistency.  One difficulty with the general analysis of 
intertemporal choice is that two different factors, time discounting and outcome 
utility, play a role, and it may not be so easy to disentangle them.  To avoid this 
difficulty, most analyses of intertemporal discounting simply assume linear utility.  
Diminishing marginal utility will distort the findings of such analyses.  It may, for 
instance, explain the so-called magnitude effect (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992). 
 A second difficulty with the analysis of intertemporal choice is that there are 
many empirical violations of the commonly used discounted utility model, and these 
further distort the conclusions drawn on the basis of this model.  The most 
questionable assumption of discounted utility, extensively violated empirically, is 
intertemporal separability (Broome 1993, pp. 151–152; Gilboa 1989 p. 1155; 
Loewenstein and Elster 1992; Prelec and Loewenstein 1991).  Many phenomena are 
based on violations thereof, such as habit formation (Becker 1996; Constantinides 
1990; Wathieu 1997), sequence effects (Krabbe and Bonsel 1998; Guyse, Keller, and 
Eppel 2002; Loewenstein and Sicherman 1991) and, in the health domain, the 
dependence of quality of life on past and future health (Dolan 2000 p. 1743; Gold et 
al. 1996, p. 100; Loomes and McKenzie 1989 p. 303). 
 We introduce time-tradeoff (TTO) sequences to resolve the aforementioned 
difficulties.  First, TTO sequences concern the receipt of single outcomes where 
intertemporal separability and its violations play no role and, second, TTO sequences 
are not affected by interactions with utility.  Thus, as we will show, we can measure 
the discount function up to its power without any interaction with utility.  To measure 
the power and, thus, the complete discount function, we either need one extra data 
point regarding utility and no time separability, or one extra data point regarding time 
separability and no utility.  The latter approach is the first one available in the 
literature that measures the discount function in an entirely utility-free manner. 
 We next turn to applications of TTO sequences that can be based entirely on TTO 
sequences, and that need no extra data points.  In particular, no extra assumption 
about utility is needed.  The first application concerns time inconsistency.  Hyperbolic 
discount functions accommodate time inconsistency, which implies arbitrage 
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opportunities.  The degree to which time inconsistency can arise and is empirically or 
normatively appropriate, is of central interest in the literature today.  An important 
advance was presented by Prelec (2004), who introduced a theoretical measure of 
time inconsistency.  One agent is more prone to time inconsistency and arbitrage than 
another if and only if the Pratt-Arrow measure of the logarithm of the discount 
function of the former always exceeds that of the latter.  This result is the analog for 
intertemporal choice of the famous risk aversion measure of Pratt and Arrow for 
decision under risk. 
 Unfortunately, Prelec’s measure seems complex to observe or analyze.  In 
decision under risk, where the Pratt-Arrow utility measure was introduced, utility is 
the only subjective factor and it can readily be measured and analyzed.  Risk premia 
provide a simple empirical criterion to test the Pratt-Arrow measure.  In intertemporal 
choice, however, the discount function interacts with utility in seemingly inextricable 
manners.  There is no analog to risk premia.  Further, if we do succeed in measuring 
the discount function, then logarithms and derivatives remain to be taken to determine 
Prelec´s measure.  It is difficult to obtain reliable estimations of derivatives from data. 
 Surprisingly, using TTO sequences we can immediately estimate Prelec’s index 
of time inconsistency.  We can depict its graph using only pencil and paper, and we 
need not carry out the measurements and calculations just suggested.  In particular, we 
need no measurement or assumption regarding utility.  We can, thus, immediately 
identify which agents are most prone to time inconsistencies, as we show in a 
representation theorem and an experiment. 
 A second direct application of TTO sequences concerns empirical tests and 
axiomatizations of several hyperbolic discount models considered in the literature.  
Up until now, most studies only rejected constant discounting, but did not test for 
possible failures of the alternative models, or which of the several alternative models 
fitted better.  Exceptions are Abdellaoui et al. (2008), who carried out an entire utility 
elicitation and essentially use intertemporal additive separability, and Keller and  
Strazzera (2002) and Pol and Cairns (2002) who assume linear utility.  Using TTO 
sequences we can measure and critically test the alternatives more efficiently.  We 
also indicate an application to Halevy’s (2007) model with risky intertemporal choice. 
 The questions used to elicit TTO sequences are easy to comprehend for subjects, 
fostering reliable data.  In an experiment, we demonstrate the feasibility by measuring 
TTO sequences of 55 subjects.  Our experimental findings lead to a number of 
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suggestions for new models of intertemporal choice, in particular regarding the 
development of discount functions that allow for increasing impatience.  We also 
falsify some popular hyperbolic discount functions. 
 The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes discounted utility and 
introduces TTO curves.  Section 3 introduces TTO sequences.  The following sections 
present applications.  Section 4 shows how TTO sequences plus some minimal extra 
information can be used to measure the discount function.  Section 5 considers 
qualitative tests of impatience, and Section 6 quantitative measurements of the degree 
of inconsistency.  Axiomatizations and tests of popular parametric families of 
discounting are in Section 7.  The following sections present an experiment.  Section 
8 describes the method, Section 9 some results that can be inferred using only pencil 
and paper, and Section 10 detailed statistical tests.  Section 11 discusses the 
experiment, Section 12 discusses some general points, and Section 13 concludes. 
 
2. Discounted Utility and Time-Tradeoff Curves 
 We consider preferences between outcome streams.  An outcome stream 
(t1:x1, …, tm:xm) yields outcome xi at time point ti for i=1, …,m and nothing at other 
time points.  Most of the results in this paper hold for general outcomes, with the 
outcome set for instance a finite set of qualitative health states.  For simplicity of 
presentation we assume, however, that outcomes are monetary and nonnegative, with  
the neutral outcome “nothing” equated with the 0 outcome.  Time point t=0 
corresponds with the present.  Throughout this paper, we assume discounted utility, 
which in this paper refers to general, possibly nonconstant, discounting.  Outcome 
streams are evaluated through 
  DU(t1:x1, …, tm:xm) = ∑i=1
m  
 ϕ(ti)U(xi) (2.1) 
with ϕ the discount function and U the (instant) utility function.  We assume: (a) ϕ(t) 
> 0 for all t; (b) ϕ is strictly decreasing (impatience) and continuous; (c) U(0) = 0; (d) 
U is strictly increasing and continuous.  The functions ϕ and U in Eq. 2.1 are ratio 
scales, i.e. 
 In Eq. 2.1, ϕ can be replaced by ϕ/λ and U by U/λ´ for any λ > 0 and λ´ > 0, (2.2) 
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where no other replacement is possible.  We used reciprocal constants for later 
convenience.  In the literature, a normalization ϕ(0) = 1 (taking λ = ϕ(0) in Eq. 2.2) is 
often assumed, but it is more convenient for this paper not to commit to such a 
scaling.   
 The summation in Eq. 2.1 implies intertemporal separability, the most 
questionable assumption of discounted utility.  To depend on this assumption as little 
as possible, most of this paper will focus on outcome streams (t:x) with only one 
nonzero outcome, called timed outcomes.  We will later show how from timed 
outcomes we can measure functions τ on the time axis such that:  
 There exist r > 0 and l = ln(λ) ∈ — such that ln(ϕ(.)) = l + rτ(.).   (2.3) 
Formally, we call a function τ a TTO curve if it satisfies Eq. 2.3.  Eq. 2.2 shows that l 
or, equivalently, λ, are immaterial.  They can be chosen arbitrarily and do not affect 
preference.  They are empirically meaningless in the sense of Stevens (1946; see also 
Narens 2002).  The parameter r, however, is empirically meaningful.  It can be seen 
that, the larger is r, given τ, the more convex are the terms in Eq. 2.1 with more 
impatience and more tolerance for inequality of outcomes over time.  Hence, to 
completely measure intertemporal attitudes we have to find out what r is. 
 The following observation shows that preferences over timed outcomes will 
never enable us to determine r: 
 If ϕ(t)U(x) represents preferences over timed outcomes (t:x), then so does  
  (ϕ/λ)r(U/λ´)r for any λ > 0, λ´ > 0, and r > 0. (2.4) 
To entirely determine the discount function, we have to combine TTO curves with 
some information beyond timed outcomes. 
 
3. Time-Tradeoff Sequences 
 A time-tradeoff (TTO) sequence is a sequence t0,…,tn of time points such that 
there exist two outcomes β < γ with 
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 (t0: β) ~ (t1: γ) 
 (t1: β) ~ (t2: γ) 
    . 
    . 
    . 
    (tn−1: β) ~ (tn: γ) (3.1) 
That is, each delay between two consecutive time points exactly offsets the same 
outcome improvement.  This delay, di = ti – ti−1, is called the willingness to wait 
(WTW)  Stationarity means that the WTW is constant, so that the points t0,…,tn are 
equally spaced in time units.  We consider a convenient TTO curve, being ln(ϕ) 
normalized at t0 and tn: 
 τt0,tn(t)  =  
ln(ϕ(t)) − ln(ϕ(tn))
ln(ϕ(t0)) − ln(ϕ(tn))  . (3.2) 
The following result shows that, whereas TTO sequences are not equally spaced in 
time units if stationarity is violated, they are always equally spaced in TTO-curve 
units.  Because its proof is instructive, we give it in the main text. 
 
OBSERVATION 3.1.  Any TTO sequence t0,…,tn is equally spaced in ln(ϕ) units, and in 
the units of any TTO-curve.  In particular, 
 τt0,tn(tj)  =  1 − 
j
n
  for all j. (3.3) 
PROOF.  
ϕ(t0)
ϕ(t1)  =  
ϕ(t1)
ϕ(t2)  = 
...
 = 
ϕ(tn−1)
ϕ(tn)   =  
U(γ)
U(β) .  In other words, 
 ln(ϕ(t0)) − ln(ϕ(t1))  =  ln(ϕ(t1)) − ln(ϕ(t2))  =  ...  =  ln(ϕ(tn−1)) − ln(ϕ(tn)) ,   (3.4) 
all differences being equal to ln(U(γ)) − ln(U(β)).  Thus, t0,…,tn are equally spaced in 
ln(ϕ) units.  They are also equally spaced in the units of any TTO sequence, such as 
τt0,tn.  Because τt0,tn is 1 at t0 and 0 at tn, with n equally big steps τt0,tn(tj−1) − τt0,tn(tj) of 
size 1/n in between, the observation follows.  · 
 
 Figure 3.1 depicts some observed values of τt0,tn.  The values come from the 
experiment reported later, reflecting subject 38’s indifferences  
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 (05 months: 700)  ~  (12 months: 900) 
 (12 months: 700)  ~  (18 months: 900) 
 (18 months: 700)  ~  (25 months: 900) 
 (25 months: 700)  ~  (37 months: 900) 
 (37 months: 700)  ~  (49 months: 900) 
 
so that n=5, t0 = 5, t1 = 12, t2 = 18, t3 = 25, t4 = 37, and t5 = 49. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We can obtain more refined information about the TTO curve by taking γ and β 
closer to each other.  We can cover a larger interval than [t0, tn] by setting t0 smaller 
(e.g. t0 = 0, as done in some questions in the experiment) and by using more steps so 
that we attain a larger value tn.  Further, to fit the data points, we can choose curves 
other than through linear interpolation as we use here for simplicity.  Thus, using TTO 
sequences, we can measure TTO curves, and ln(ϕ) up to its unit r, to any desired 
degree of precision.   
 
FIGURE 3.1.  The TTO curve τt0,t5 of subject 38 
months 
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4. Using TTO Sequences to Measure the Discount Function 
 To completely measure the discount function ϕ we have to use TTO curves 
alongside further data.  We present two ways to accomplish such a measurement.  
First, assume that we have measured a TTO curve τ together with an estimate of a 
utility ratio U(γ)/U(β), for some γ > β > 0.1  Then we find time points t and s to 
generate an indifference (t:β) ~ (s:γ).  Substituting Eq. 2.1, setting λ = 1 in Eq. 2.4, 
and taking logarithms implies 
 ϕ(.) = erτ(.) with r = ln(U(γ)/U(β))
τ(t) −τ(s) . 
Thus we have identified r and, consequently, the complete discount function ϕ.  
Figure 4.1 displays the discount function of subject 38 if we have the extra estimation  
 U(900)/U(700) = 1.12, (4.1) 
which is plausible under the diminishing marginal utility commonly assumed in 
empirical studies.   
 For a second, utility-free, method to estimate the discount function based on a 
TTO curve, assume that, besides τ (with ϕ = erτ), we observe an indifference 
 (t:x, t´:x) ~ (s:x, s´:x)  for s > t > t´ > s´ (4.2) 
(where s stands for spread out and t for tight).  Note that only one nonzero outcome x 
is involved.  Substituting DU (Eq. 2.1) and dropping the common factor U(x), we 
obtain 
 erτ(t) + erτ(t´)  =   erτ(s) + erτ(s´) . (4.3) 
There exists a unique r that solves this equality for every quadruple eτ(t), eτ(t´), eτ(s), and 
eτ(s´).2  Under discounted utility, r must be positive which can be seen to be equivalent 
                                               
1
 Given that we can always normalize U(0) = 0 and U(β) = 1, the assumption amounts to observing one utility value 
U(γ). 
2
 Equalities of this kind are often studied under expected utility with exponential utility erτ.  Eq. 4.3 results if a fifty-
fifty gamble with outcomes τ(t) and τ(t´) is equivalent to one with outcomes τ(s) and τ(s´).  Including negative 
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to τ(t) + τ(t´) > τ(s) + τ(s´) (corresponding with convexity of erτ in τ).  If this 
inequality is violated, then DU is violated.  In particular, violations of time 
separability will generate such violations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.2 depicts a discount function that we obtained for subject 38.  We used 
the extra indifference  
 (12:700, 16:700) ~ (6:700, 24:700),  (4.4) 
observed from this subject in a pilot experiment, as a version of Eq. 4.2 to estimate r.  
We obtained an estimated power r = 0.58. 
                                                                                                                                      
powers r for risk aversion and power r=0 for risk neutrality, the exponential family covers any degree of risk aversion 
and can accommodate any quadruple τ(s) < τ(t) < τ(t´) < τ(s´) in Eq. 4.3.   
FIGURE 4.1.  The discount function using Figure 3.1 and Eq. 4.1 
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 The two examples (one with Eq. 4.1 and one with Eq. 4.4), showed how TTO 
curves, together with minimal extra data, provide measurements and tests of discount 
functions in deterministic models.  Given that the major empirical problems for DU 
occur for outcome streams with more than one outcome, and the ease of measuring 
TTO curves, we think that the analysis of intertemporal choice can be improved by 
giving a central role to TTO curves.  If only one extra data point of utility is used, 
then we can make a special effort to obtain this data point as reliably as possible.  This 
task will be easier and can be done more reliably than having to estimate the complete 
utility function (Abdellaoui et al. 2008; Chapman 1996; Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and 
Rutström 2008) or, worse, simply assuming that utility is linear as done mostly in the 
literature.  If only one indifference based on time separability is used, then we can 
similarly make a special effort to obtain this indifference as reliably as possible.  The 
latter approach identifies time discounting in an entirely utility-free way.  It is, 
obviously, not affected by errors in utility measurement. 
 Empirical tests of the procedures described here, with proper error theories for 
choice incorporated, are left to future studies.  In this paper we focus on TTO 
sequences because they can measure time inconsistencies, a topic that has received 
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much attention in the recent literature.  We present this application, together with 
some other applications, in the following sections. 
 
5. TTO Sequences and Qualitative Tests of Time 
Inconsistency 
 This section shows how TTO sequences can be used to qualitatively examine 
deviations from stationarity.  Throughout this section, we use no other information 
than provided by the TTO curve.  Constant discounting holds if ϕ(t) = δt for a 
discount factor δ with 0 < δ < 1.  Then delaying all outcomes in some outcome 
streams by a period ε implies that all discounted utilities are multiplied by the same 
factor δε, so that the ordering of the time streams is not affected and constant 
impatience holds indeed.  It is well-known that the reversed implication also holds 
under common assumptions, that is, constant impatience implies constant discounting 
(Koopmans 1960).  Decreasing impatience holds if an indifference (s:x) ~ (t:y), with s 
< t and x < y implies (s+ε:x) Ç (t+ε:y) for all ε > 0.  Then a common delay brings 
more willingness to wait for a better outcome.  Increasing impatience holds if the 
weak preference in the implication is reversed.  A TTO sequence readily identifies 
constant, increasing, or decreasing impatience through constant, decreasing, or 
increasing WTW (i.e., tj+1 − tj). 
 In general, violations of stationarity (constant impatience) need not imply time 
inconsistency (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005, section I; Harvey, 1995 p. 389; Thaler, 
1981).  Under an assumption of homogeneous time, however, entailing that we can 
use stopwatch time (we can always reset the clock at 0 at the time point of choosing 
between outcome streams), the two conditions become equivalent.  This will be 
assumed throughout this paper.  It is implicitly assumed in many papers.  Violations 
of stationarity then imply time inconsistency and vulnerability to arbitrage.  We will 
return to this point in Section 6. 
 Whether a function is convex, linear, or concave is not affected by 
normalizations.  Hence, τ is the same as ln(ϕ) in this regard.  We summarize the 
observations made. 
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OBSERVATION 5.1.  Stationarity implies linearity of the TTO curve and of ln(ϕ).  
Decreasing impatience implies convexity of the TTO curve and of ln(ϕ).  Increasing 
impatience implies concavity of the TTO curve and of ln(ϕ).  ·  
 
 An interesting interpretation of TTO curves results if we assume that deviations 
from stationarity are due to a nonlinear perception of time.  That is, a person perceives 
time as f(t) instead of t, and discounts exponentially in the (mis)perceived f units.  It 
leads to the discount function ϕ(t) = erf(t).  Because we have ϕ(t) = erτ(t), it follows that 
τ can be interpreted as a time (mis)perception function f.  In other words, TTO curves 
provide the time units in terms of which discounting is constant. 
 
6. TTO-Sequences and a Quantitative Measure of Time 
Inconsistency 
 This section shows how TTO sequences can be used to obtain a quantitative 
measure of time inconsistency.  This measure will show to what extent people are 
prone to arbitrage because of their time inconsistency.  We again use no other 
information than provided by TTO curves.  Consider the following two indifferences, 
similar to Eq. 3.1. 
 (s:β) ~ (t:γ) and (s+σ:β) ~ (t+σ+ε:γ) 
  for s < t (s for “soon”), β < γ, and σ > 0. (6.1) 
For the special case of s+σ = t, the indifferences provide a TTO sequence t0 = s, t1 = t 
= s+σ, and t2 = t+σ+ε.  We have ε > 0 under decreasing impatience, ε = 0 under 
constant impatience, and ε < 0 under increasing impatience.  Thus, ε can be taken as 
an index of deviation from stationarity.  For ε > 0, we, indeed, obtain the following 
violations of stationarity: 
 (s:β) í (t´:γ) and (s+σ:β) Ç (t´+σ:γ) with at least one preference strict (6.2) 
for all t ≤ t´ ≤ t+ε and for no other t´.  The interval [t, t+ε], thus, designates the domain 
of time inconsistency and arbitrage: At time 0 the person, when endowed with 
(s+σ:β), is willing to exchange it for (t´+σ:γ).  When asked to reconsider at time point 
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σ, the person now perceives of the options as (s:β) and (t´:γ), and is willing to go back 
to the β-option.3  The person is willing to pay small amounts for the two exchanges 
(take it small enough not to affect preference otherwise).  Then the person has ended 
up at the original endowment less some money, which entails arbitrage.  Benabou and 
Tirole (2002), Gruber and Koszegi (2001), Laibson (1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin 
(1999a), Prelec (2004), Strotz (1956), Thaler and Benartzi (2004), and numerous 
others derived various similar choice anomalies from Eq. 6.2.  For example, a 
sophisticated person who is informed about the arbitrage possibility beforehand may 
avoid it but then becomes vulnerable to commitments to dominated options, due to 
lack of future self-control.  Cubitt and Sugden (2001) pointed out that an agent may 
refuse a trade that is not isolated but part of arbitrage. 
 For ε < 0 in Eq. 6.1, as is typical of increasing impatience, we have 
 (s:β) Ç (t´:γ) and (s+σ:β) í (t´+σ:γ) with at least one preference strict (6.3) 
for all t+ε ≤ t´ ≤ t and for no other t´.  Now [t+ε, t] is the domain of arbitrage.   
 Consider next another preference relation í*, satisfying the assumptions of the 
preceding sections as does í, with corresponding ϕ*, U*, τ*.   
 
DEFINITION 6.1.  í* exhibits more decreasing impatience than í if the equivalences 
for í in Eq. 6.1 plus (s:β*) ~* (t:γ*) imply (s+σ:β*) Ç* (t+σ+ε:γ*).  · 
 
Prelec (2004) gave an equivalent definition.  Under decreasing impatience for í and 
í*, the condition of Definition 6.1 and Eq. 6.1 imply, for 
 (s:β*) ~* (t:γ*) and (s+σ:β*) ~* (t+σ+ε*:γ*), (6.4) 
that either ε* exceeds ε > 0, or that such a ε* does not exist.  In the first case the 
domain [t,t+ε*] of arbitrage for í* exceeds the corresponding domain [t,t+ε] for í.  
In the second case the domain for arbitrage for í* is in fact [t, t+∞), as is readily 
verified, which obviously exceeds the corresponding domain [t,t+ε] for í. 
 There is also interest in increasing impatience, because of which we extend 
Definition 6.1. 
                                               
3
 In the latter step we use homogeneity of time. 
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DEFINITION 6.2.  í* exhibits more increasing impatience than í if the equivalences in 
Eq. 6.1 plus (s:β*) ~* (t:γ*) imply (s+σ:β*) í* (t+σ+ε:γ*).  · 
 
For preference relations with increasing impatience, the arbitrage domain [t+ε,t] is 
larger as the increase in impatience is larger. 
 The following theorem shows that TTO curves identify proneness to arbitrage.  
As usual, τ* is more convex than τ if there exists a convex transformation f such that 
τ*(t) = f(τ(t)) for all t, which holds if and only if −τ*´´
τ*´
  ≥ −
τ´´
τ´
  everywhere on their 
domain.  Note that, whereas the Pratt-Arrow index is an index of concavity for 
increasing functions, the functions τ and τ* are decreasing.  Then the Pratt-Arrow 
index is an index of convexity rather than of concavity.  Analogously, τ* is more 
concave than τ if there exists a concave transformation f such that τ*(t) = f(τ(t)) for all 
t, which holds if and only if  τ*´´
τ*´
  ≥  
τ´´
τ´
  everywhere on their domain.   
 The aforementioned comparative convexity and concavity definitions are not 
affected by a change in unit or level.  Hence, τ has the same degree of convexity as 
ln(ϕ): 
   −
τ´´
τ´
    =  −
ln(ϕ)´´
ln(ϕ)´   (6.5) 
 The following theorem adapts Prelec’s (2004) Proposition 1, stating conditions in 
terms of TTO curves rather than ln(ϕ).  We also add results on increasing impatience.  
 
THEOREM 6.3.  Assume that í and í* satisfy discounted utility (Eq. 2.1), with a TTO 
curve τ for í and a TTO curve τ* for í*. 
(i) í* exhibits more decreasing impatience than í if and only if τ* is more 
convex than τ. 
(ii) í* exhibits more increasing impatience than í* if and only if τ* is more 
concave than τ. 
  · 
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Theorem 6.3 demonstrates formally that the degree of convexity of a TTO-curve 
determines the degree of decreasing impatience and, thus, the domain for arbitrage 
and the proneness to anomalies, in the sense of Prelec (2004).  From a mathematical 
perspective, the move of Theorem 6.3(i) from Prelec’s Proposition 1 is elementary, 
replacing convexity of ln(ϕ) by the equivalent convexity of τ.  From an empirical 
perspective the move is crucial though, because τ is directly observable whereas ln(ϕ) 
is not. 
 
7. TTO-Sequences to Axiomatize and Test Parametric 
     Families of Discount Functions 
 Observation 5.1 demonstrated how TTO sequences can be used to test whether 
Samuelson’s constant discounting model holds.  In this section we investigate 
alternative discount functions.  A popular function to capture decreasing impatience is 
the quasi-hyperbolic discount function (Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson 1997).  It is 
given by 
 ϕ(t) = 1 if t=0   and 
 ϕ(t) = βδt if t>0, (7.1) 
for a constant β ≤ 1 with, again, 0 < δ < 1.  Under quasi-hyperbolic discounting we 
have decreasing impatience only at time point 0, and constant impatience thereafter.  
The following observation readily follows from substitution.  Gul and Pesendorfer 
(2005, Theorem 4) provide an alternative characterization in terms of choices between 
decision problems. 
 
OBSERVATION 7.1.  Quasi-hyperbolic discounting holds if and only if WTW (tj+1 − tj) 
for TTO sequences is constant with the only exception that WTW may be smaller if tj 
= 0.  · 
 
 A more flexible model that captures decreasing impatience not only for the 
present, but also for future time points, is generalized hyperbolic discounting 
(Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).  It is defined by 
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 ϕ(t) = (1+ht)−r/h, (7.2) 
with h ≥ 0 and r > 0.  Here h can be interpreted as an index of decreasing impatience.  
Stationarity with constant discounting e−rt is the limiting case for h→0 (Loewenstein 
and Prelec 1992).  This family incorporates several popular hyperbolic families other 
than quasi-hyperbolic discounting.   Mazur (1987) and Harvey (1995) considered 
proportional discounting (h=r), and Harvey (1986, Eq. 7) considered the special case 
h=1.   
 Rohde (2007) proposed the hyperbolic factor for analyzing generalized 
hyperbolic discounting.  For a TTO sequence t0, …, tn, the hyperbolic factor is 
defined as 
 hyperbolic factor(i,j) = (tj−ti) − (tj−1−ti−1)ti(tj−1−ti−1) − ti−1(tj−ti)   (7.3) 
for all j>i.  For one TTO sequence as in Eq. 3.1 with n=5, 15 (= 5+4+3+2+1) 
hyperbolic factors can be calculated.  The following result adapts Rohde's (2007) 
Theorems 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 to TTO sequences. 
 
OBSERVATION 7.2.  For generalized hyperbolic discounting, ϕ(t) = (1+ht)−r/h, the 
denominator in Eq. 7.3 is always positive, and the hyperbolic factor is always equal to 
h, independent of i, j, and the TTO sequence considered.  For constant discounting 
(stationarity), the hyperbolic factor is always zero.  For quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
the hyperbolic factor is nonnegative if ti−1 = 0 and it is zero if ti−1 > 0.  · 
 
Thus, we can readily calculate the hyperbolic factor for TTO sequences and can then 
test many popular models of discounting. 
 Halevy (2007) introduced a model for risky intertemporal choice where time 
inconsistencies are generated by probability weighting.  TTO curves then measure the 
curvature of Halevy’s probability weighting, with linearity, convexity, and concavity 
of one corresponding with the other.  Halevy’s model can be combined with implicit-
risk assumptions that can generate increasing impatience, a topic discussed in more 
detail in the following section. 
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8. Method of Experiment 
 In the next sections we present and discuss an experiment using TTO sequences 
to analyze intertemporal choice. 
 
Participants.  N=55 subjects took part, 28 male and 27 female.  There were 31 
students from Erasmus University Rotterdam, 21 of whom from finance or economics 
and the others from various other disciplines.  The remaining 24 students were from 
Maastricht University (1 economics, 1 finance, and the rest from various other 
disciplines). 
 
Motivating subjects.  Every subject received 10 for participation.  All payoffs in the 
stimuli were hypothetical.  This point is discussed in Section 11.   
 
Procedure.  The experiment was run by computer, and subjects were interviewed 
individually.  On average, the task took 15 minutes per subject.  We ran extensive 
pilots with 53 subjects in order to determine the appropriate setup. 
 We took one month as the unit of time.  Subjects first went through a training 
phase, where preferences (0:700) Ä (1:900) and (0:700) ê (600: 900) were mostly 
observed.  Then, in a training matching task, we asked for the value t to generate the 
indifference (0:700) ~ (t:900), and then for the value t to generate the indifference 
(0:2800) ~ (t:3300). 
 
Stimuli.  We elicited four TTO sequences for each subject (Table 8.1).  Every 
sequence consisted of 5 steps (n=5).  All tasks were matching tasks, similar to the last 
task of the training phase. 
 The computer screen is given in the Appendix.  The pilots suggested that a direct 
successive elicitation of the time points t1,…,t5 of one TTO sequence could generate 
order effects.  Hence, in the main experiment we first elicited t1 for every TTO 
sequence, next t2 for every TTO sequence, and so on. 
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TABLE 8.1.  Parameters for the four TTO sequences 
sequences  t0 β γ 
I 0 months 
700 900 
II 0 months 
2800 3300 
III 5 months 
700 900 
IV 0 months 
1600 1900 
The outcomes β, γ, and the initial time point t0 are as in Eq. 3.1. 
 
Analysis.  We did all tests both parametrically and non-parametrically.  These always 
gave similar results, and we only report the non-parametric tests.  
 
Analysis of Group Averages.  Changes in WTW indicate whether subjects satisfy 
constant, decreasing or increasing impatience.  We tested for constant WTW for each 
TTO sequence separately using a Friedman test. 
 Next, for every single pair of consecutive WTWs (for di and di−1) we tested 
equality using Wilcoxon tests.  We also tested equality of WTW between the first 
questions of sequence I ((0:700) ~ (t:900)) and of sequence III ((5:700) ~ (t:900)).  
Because these concern the same outcomes, stationarity predicts that WTW be the 
same.  We checked whether the temporal attitude suggested by this comparison is 
consistent with the temporal attitude suggested by comparisons within sequence I.  
That is, we checked whether the change in WTW from the first question of sequence I 
to the first question of sequence III has the same sign as the first change in WTW 
within sequence I. 
 
Analyses of Individual Data.  A subject was classified as exhibiting increasing 
(constant, decreasing) impatience if at least 50% of her changes in WTW suggested 
so, where we considered all sequences together.  A double classification as constant or 
increasing (50% constant and 50% increasing) was reclassified as increasing, with a 
similar procedure for decreasing.  A double classification as increasing and decreasing 
was taken as unclassified, as were all other cases.  We used these conservative criteria 
to reduce the effects of response error.  Such a threshold of 50% has been used before 
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in the literature (Abdellaoui 2000).  We tested whether significantly more subjects are 
classified as increasingly or decreasingly impatient using Wilcoxon.  
 Next, we tested whether quasi-hyperbolic discounting holds.  For every subject 
we split all changes in WTW of all TTO sequences into two groups: the group 
containing all changes in WTW where the first time point was 0, and the group 
containing the rest.  For both groups, we chose the same 50% classification as before.  
Under quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the WTW should increase in the former group 
and be constant in the latter.  We performed similar Wilcoxon tests as before.  
 We developed global heuristic measures of convexity of the TTO curve.  For 
example, the normalized area above the measured TTO curve is a plausible index of 
convexity and of decreasing impatience.  This area is a monotonic transform of the 
decreasing-impatience index (DI-index), defined by 
 DI-index = ∑ j=1
n−1( i
n
  − t
~
i ) , with t~i the normalization of ti (t~i = ti−tnt0−tn). (8.1) 
The DI-index bears some resemblance with the Gini-index in inequality measurement. 
 For deviations from stationarity, absolute values of deviations from linearity are 
more relevant.  Thus, we defined the non-stationarity index (NS-index) as 
 NS-index  =  ∑i=1
n-1
 | i
n
 −t
~
i | . (8.2) 
It provides an overall index of deviation from stationarity and proneness to 
inconsistencies without concern for the direction of the deviation.  To the extent that 
stationarity is rational, the NS-index could be interpreted as an irrationality index. 
 We calculated the DI and NS indexes for each subject.  We also calculated the 
hyperbolic factors as explained in Section 7.  We compared the indexes of all subjects 
between sequences by means of Wilcoxon signed rank tests.  To test for a possible 
special effect of first questions, we also considered sequences with the first step left 
out.  We computed the DI-index for these reduced sequences as follows: DI-index = 
∑i=1
3  
 ( i4  − t
~
i+1 ), with t~i the normalization t~i = ti−t3t0−t3 .   
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9. Results from Eyeballing the TTO curves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Before presenting detailed statistical results, we present heuristic results that can 
immediately be inferred from eyeballing TTO curves.  Figure 9.1 displays seven TTO 
curves, obtained from seven subjects, on normalized time intervals.  We immediately 
see that the curve of subject 7 is more convex, implying more decreasing impatience, 
than the curve of subject 38.  By Theorem 6.3i, subject 7 is more prone to time 
inconsistency and arbitrage than subject 38.  Subject 24's curve is also always below 
that of subject 38, suggesting more decreasing impatience.  Locally around 0.45, 
subject 38 exhibits more convexity though, so that the ordering of convexity, while 
holding throughout most of the domain, does not hold universally.  The curves of 
1,000,800,600,400,200,00
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FIGURE 9.1.   The TTO curves τ of several subjects 
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subjects 7 and 24 intersect and there is no uniform ordering regarding their degree of 
nonstationarity over the whole interval [t0,t5]. 
 There are several concave curves, exhibiting increasing rather than decreasing 
impatience.  Theorem 6.3ii shows that subject 10 is more prone to time inconsistency 
than subject 5.  The DI values are 0.63 (subject 7), 0.52 (subject 24), and 0.36 (subject 
38).  They suggest that, whereas there is no unambiguous ordering between subjects 7 
and 24 as we saw before, subject 7 exhibits more decreasing impatience overall than 
subject 24.  Similarly, subject 24 does so more than subject 38.  Subjects 5, 10, and 49 
exhibit increasing impatience.  Accordingly, their DI-indexes will be negative, being 
−0.26 (subject 5), −0.60 (subject 10), and −0.45 (subject 49).  Overall, subject 10 
exhibits more increasing impatience than subject 49 and subject 49 exhibits more than 
subject 5. 
 The DI-index of subject 13 is 0.08, and this subject exhibits little decreasing or 
increasing impatience in an overall sense.  Yet, this subject does deviate from 
stationarity.  This is indicated by the NS index, which is 0.15 for this subject. 
 
10. Results and Statistical Tests 
Group Averages 
Figure 10.1 gives the TTO curves constructed from the medians of the answers of all 
subjects.  The curves suggest that subjects are increasingly impatient in the beginning 
and near future, and constantly impatient thereafter.  Statistical analyses confirm this 
pattern.  The Friedman tests rejected constantness of the WTW (p < 0.01) for all 
sequences.  We repeated the test with the first WTW excluded.  As expected, then the 
null hypothesis of constant WTW is not rejected (p > 0.20 for all tests).  Thus, our 
findings suggest that people satisfy stationarity for time points beyond a certain 
threshold.  From the third sequence we can see that this threshold exceeds 5 months. 
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Figure 10.2 shows median WTWs.  The vertical axes all have the same scale and give 
the WTW.  We can clearly see that the WTW drops in the beginning and remains 
more or less constant later on for every sequence.  This is confirmed by Wilcoxon 
tests.  The results of the Wilcoxon test are summarized in Table 10.1.  The WTW 
changed significantly in the first steps (d2 − d1) (α = 0.01).  The WTW decreases 
there, suggesting increasing impatience.  The WTW increases in the second step (d3 - 
d2) for sequence III (α = 0.05).  No other changes are significant at α = 0.05. 
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FIGURE 10.1. The TTO curves τ for median answers of the four TTO sequences 
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TABLE 10.1.  Wilcoxon signed rank tests: Z (p-value, 2-tailed) 
WTW  
Sequence d2 – d1 d3 − d2 d4 – d3 d5 – d4 
I -4.40 (0.000) -0.51  (0.612) -0.63  (0.531) -0.34  (0.732) 
II -4.50 (0.000) 1.35  (0.176) -0.93  (0.352) -0.98  (0.329) 
III -3.39 (0.001) 2.00  (0.046) -0.29  (0.769) -0.95  (0.341) 
IV -3.19 (0.001) 1.03  (0.302) -0.41 (0.681)  1.05  (0.293) 
 
A Wilcoxon test shows that the first WTW of the third sequence is significantly lower 
(p < 0.01) than the first WTW of the first sequence.  Thus, subjects are consistent 
between sequences I and III. 
 
Individual Data 
The individual data confirm the preceding findings.  Subjects are increasingly 
impatient for time points close to 0 and constantly impatient for later time points.  The 
classification of subjects based on all sequences together yields 18 subjects exhibiting 
constant impatience, 3 exhibiting decreasing impatience, 10 exhibiting increasing 
impatience, and 24 not classified (Table 10.2).  Thus, based on this classification we 
cannot say much about the behavior of individual subjects.  The Wilcoxon test shows 
that there is more tendency towards increasing than towards decreasing impatience 
(p=0.052).  In the group of all questions with a first time point zero, 8 subjects exhibit 
constant impatience, 3 subjects exhibit decreasing impatience, 36 subjects exhibit 
increasing impatience, and 8 subjects could not be classified.  This suggests that most 
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FIGURE 10.2. Median willingness to wait for each sequence 
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subjects indeed are increasingly impatient for time point zero, which is supported by 
the Wilcoxon test (p=0.000).  In the other group (first time point positive), 21 subjects 
exhibit constant impatience, 5 subjects exhibit decreasing impatience, 6 subjects 
exhibit increasing impatience, and 23 subjects could not be classified.  Thus, it 
appears that most subjects indeed exhibit constant impatience for time points not too 
close to 0.  
 
TABLE 10.2.  Classification of individuals 
 Impatience 
Questions Constant Decreasing Increasing unclassified 
all 18 3 10 24 
time point 0 8 3 36 8 
time point > 0 21 5 6 23 
 
 
 Calculations of the hyperbolic factors revealed that positivity of the denominator 
in Eq. 7.3, a necessary condition for generalized hyperbolic discounting (Observation 
7.2) was widely violated, for virtually all subjects in several questions.  This provides 
evidence against generalized hyperbolic discounting, and the hyperbolic factor cannot 
be calculated in many situations. 
 We report the indexes of decreasing impatience (DI-index) and of non-
stationarity (NS-index) to compare subjects.  The medians of the DI-indexes 
(regarding decreasing impatience) are significantly negative for all 4 sequences (p < 
0.01) so that subjects are increasingly impatient overall.  The medians of the DI-index 
were −0.33, −0.28, −0.092, and −0.19, respectively.  The third sequence had both a 
lower NS-index and a lower absolute value of the DI-index.  This is probably caused 
by the fact that the third sequence starts closer to the threshold from whereon subjects 
satisfy constant impatience.  The DI-indexes of the reduced sequences, the sequences 
without the first steps, did not deviate significantly from zero, indicating that the 
increasing impatience found earlier is indeed due to the first step of every sequence.   
 We proceed by considering only the DI-index and NS-index of the complete 
sequences.  Based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test, the DI-index and the NS-index are 
significantly different for every sequence (p < 0.01), where the NS-index is always 
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larger than minus the DI-index.  Because most indexes of decreasing impatience are 
negative, this finding implies that for most subjects the TTO curve τ intersects the 
curve belonging to a linear TTO curve at least once.  Most subjects are, therefore, not 
clearly increasingly impatient or clearly decreasingly impatient, but are a mixture of 
both. 
 There was no significant difference in the DI-index and the NS-index between 
sequences I and II and between sequences III and IV.  For all other pairs of sequences, 
the sequence with the higher sequence number provided significantly higher DI-
indexes and significantly lower NS-indexes than the ones before (p < 0.01 for all but 
one, p < 0.05 for all).  Thus, subjects became less non-stationary and more 
decreasingly impatient or, equivalently, less increasingly impatient in later sequences. 
 On average, men had higher DI indexes and lower NS indexes, except for the DI 
index in sequence III, but the differences were usually not significant. 
  
 
11. Discussion of the Experiment 
 Our subjects satisfy increasing impatience for small delays and constant 
impatience thereafter.  Thus, we find a kind of reversed quasi-hyperbolic discounting, 
where impatience is constant after a certain threshold but is increasing rather than 
decreasing in the beginning.  Impatience, however, continues to increase up to 5 
months and is not constant immediately after the present.  Informal discussions with 
subjects indicated that they understood the questions and knew what they wanted to 
answer.  There was clear support for our finding of increasing impatience from these 
informal discussions.  Many students indicated that they did not mind a delay much at 
first, but after a long wait they disliked further delays more.  This finding is opposite 
to subjects becoming more insensitive to delays over time, as is commonly assumed 
in the literature.   
 Our finding of increasing impatience is consistent with several other studies 
(Carbone 2008; Gigliotti and Sopher, 2004; Read, Airoldi and Loewe, 2005; Read, 
Frederick, Orsel, and Rahman, 2005; Rubinstein, 2003; Sayman and Onculer, 2007).  
Read, Frederick, Orsel, and Rahman (2005) found that hyperbolic discounting is only 
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observed when time is described in delay terms as opposed to calendar time terms.  
Rubinstein (2003) reported three experiments that provide evidence against constant 
or decreasing impatience.  Bommier (2006) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) gave 
theoretical reasons why increasing impatience can occur.  Other studies found neither 
increasing nor decreasing impatience, so that stationarity was not rejected (Sopher and 
Seth 2006; Holcomb and Nelson 1992). 
 The importance of using real incentives rather than hypothetical choice is well 
understood in the literature today.  We nevertheless used hypothetical choice, with a 
flat fee for participation, for a number of reasons.  First, for intertemporal choice, 
reliable future arrangements are hard to implement, not only for the experimenters 
but, more importantly, also for the subjects who will face considerable transaction 
costs.  The latter will distort the experiment.  There have been some impressive 
studies in the literature that succeeded in implementing real incentives in 
intertemporal choice, but they always concerned relatively small time periods.  Here, 
discounting can be expected to be relatively weak, with a strong present bias.  This 
holds the more so because real incentives have to involve relatively small payments 
that will not easily dominate the transaction costs.   
 Although several studies have found differences between real and hypothetical 
choice (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001), the majority of studies have found that for 
cognitively simple tasks such as those in our experiments the behavioral patterns are 
the same (Camerer and Hogarth 1999).  In the intertemporal choices in our 
experiment, there is no incentive for our subjects to please the experimenter one way 
or the other, unlike experiments about social behavior.  Ways to implement real 
incentives for intertemporal choice with large time delays is an important topic for 
future research. 
 The measurement of TTO sequences is chained, which means that answers given 
in one question are an input in following questions.  A drawback is that order effects 
can occur.  It is, however, unlikely that such order effects would have caused the 
increasing impatience we found.  The setup of the experiment made it hard for  
subjects to notice that the questions were chained and that several of them together 
served to elicit sequences.  A second drawback of chaining question is that it leads to 
a propagation of errors, with an error in answer 1 affecting the error in future 
questions.  Propagations of errors in similar chained measurements have been 
analyzed by Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) and Abdellaoui et al. (2005). Both studies 
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concluded that the effect of error propagation on chained measurement was small.  
Depending on the error theory assumed, smaller errors may result when measuring a 
distance [t0,t5] through five intermediate steps rather than in one blow. 
 Many studies that provide evidence in favor of decreasing impatience elicit 
indifference values in the outcome dimension.  They fix two time points and one 
outcome and elicit a second outcome that makes the subject indifferent between the 
two timed outcome streams.  We elicit indifference values in the time dimension.  
Because we are interested in properties of the discount function, and not of the utility 
function, it is more natural to focus subjects’ attention on this dimension.  Because, by 
the construction of a TTO sequence, utilities cancel out from the equations, our 
method does not require richness in the outcome dimension and can, for instance, be 
used with qualitative health outcomes.  It naturally exploits the richness in the time 
dimension that is available anyhow.  
 Although eliciting indifferences in the time dimension has not been very 
common, it has been used on a number of occasions, for instance by Mazur (1987).  
He conducted experiments with pigeons instead of humans.  Green, Fristoe and 
Myerson (1994) did similar experiments with humans.  These studies exploited the 
richness of the time dimension to study temporal preference similarly as we did.  
They, however, still assumed linear utility.   
 We chose matching to directly elicit indifferences rather than derive indifferences 
from choices.  There have been many debates about the pros and cons of matching 
versus choice.  A drawback of choice is that subjects more easily resort to 
noncompensatory heuristics than they do for matching (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and 
Hertwig 2006; Huber, Ariely, and Fischer 2001, p. 72; Montgomery 1983; Tversky 
1972).  A drawback of matching is that it generates biases of its own, with scale 
compatibility the most well known bias (Huber, Ariely, and Fischer 2001; Bostic, 
Herrnstein, and Luce 1990; Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic 1988).  A feature of TTO 
sequences that supports the use of matching questions is that TTO sequences provide 
robustness against such distortions.  For example, assume that a subject overweights 
the time dimension because of scale compatibility.  We have  
 λ(ln(ϕ(tj−1)) − ln(ϕ(tj)))  =  ln(U(γ)) − ln(U(β)) (11.1) 
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with λ > 1 instead of λ = 1 as it was in Eq. 3.4 and its proof.  Then still all our 
inferences and applications of the TTO sequence remain correct.  They continue to be 
equally spaced in ln(ϕ) units, which is all we used in our analyses.  Of course, biases 
different than those in Eq. 11.1 can exist.  Still, TTO sequences provide robustness 
against at least those parts of the biases that have the same effect on all questions.  
The main reason for us to choose matching when eliciting the TTO sequences is that 
matching is considerably more tractable and efficient than choice.  If its main bias is 
neutralized, then it becomes an especially attractive option, enhancing the tractability 
of the experiment. 
 Our findings suggest a number of new directions for intertemporal choice.  
Virtually all existing models, including quasi-hyperbolic discounting and generalized 
hyperbolic discounting, assume universal decreasing or constant impatience, and have 
no clear extension to allow for increasing impatience.  However, even if group 
averages satisfy decreasing impatience, then there will still be individuals who exhibit 
increasing impatience, so that for any data fitting at the individual level such functions 
are required.  For this reason we could not implement the planned test to discriminate 
which of the currently popular models fits the data better: they were all rejected.  In 
particular Rohde's (2007) hyperbolic factor, targeted to the currently popular families, 
was not defined for a large portion of the answers given, which occurred at least once 
for virtually every subject.  Hence, it is desirable that more general functions for 
discounting be developed. 
 
12. A Modification for the Health Domain 
 We use the term time-tradeoff sequence in analogy to the time-tradeoff method 
commonly used in the health domain.  There an indifference such as (living 10 years 
while being blind) ~ (living 9 years in perfect health) is used to assess the relative 
utility of being blind, U(blind)/U(perfect health), through the ratio ϕ(9 years)/ϕ(10 
years), where ϕ reflects a value of life duration which is often taken linear for 
convenience.  These health questions are of the same format as the questions used in 
our time-tradeoff sequences.   
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 An interpretational difference between the time-tradeoff method from health and 
our method is that time reflects duration of experience in the health questions, 
whereas in our study time reflects waiting time before receipt of an outcome.  To 
express the two different interpretations of time, we may use the term waiting-time-
tradeoff sequence, whereas the method in the health domain can then be called 
experience-time-tradeoff method.  When no confusion will arise it is easier to use the 
short term without interpretation expressed, which is what we do in our paper. A topic 
for future study concerns the application of TTO sequences in the health domain. 
 
13. Conclusion 
 TTO sequences are easy to administer and provide a general tool for analyzing 
intertemporal choice.  They facilitate measurements of the discount function, 
qualitative and quantitative tests of impatience, quantifications of the degree of time 
inconsistency, and axiomatizations of parametric families of discounting. 
 
Appendix 
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.3.  Because τ and τ* are strictly decreasing functions, τ*(t) = 
f(τ(t)) for a strictly increasing function f.  Take any intervals [d,c] and [b,a] to the 
right of [d,c] (b > d and a > c) in the domain of f.  Then a = τ(s), b = τ(t), c = τ(s+σ), 
and d = τ(t+σ+ε) for some s < t, s+σ < t+σ+ε, σ > 0, σ + ε > 0.  Because the ranges of 
U and U* contain nondegenerate intervals with 0 as lower bound, there exist 
outcomes β < γ with  
 (s:β) ~ (t:γ)  (A.1) 
and outcomes β* < γ* with  
 (s:β*) ~* (t:γ*). (A.2) 
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(Here is where we crucially use continuity of utility.)  Only the utility ratios U(β)/U(γ) 
and U*(β*)/U*(γ*) matter for all that follows and, hence, the particular choices of β, 
γ, β*, γ* are immaterial for all that follows.   
 We have equivalence of the following statements: 
a − b  =  c − d; 
τ(s) − τ(t)  =  τ(s+σ) − τ(t+σ+ε); 
lnϕ(s) − lnϕ(t)  =  lnϕ(s+σ) − lnϕ(t+σ+ε); 
ϕ(s)/ϕ(t)  =  ϕ(s+σ)/ϕ(t+σ+ε); 
(s+σ:β)  ~  (t+σ+ε:γ). 
 
We also have logical equivalence of the following statements: 
f(a) − f(b)  ≥  f(c) − f(d). 
τ*(s) − τ*(t)  ≥  τ*(s+σ) − τ*(t+σ+ε); 
lnϕ*(s) − lnϕ*(t)  ≥  lnϕ*(s+σ) − lnϕ*(t+σ+ε); 
ϕ*(s)/ϕ*(t)  ≥  ϕ*(s+σ)/ϕ*(t+σ+ε); 
(s+σ:β*)  Ç  (t+σ+ε:γ*); 
 
It is well-known that f is convex if and only if for all a, b, c, d as above we have f(a) − 
f(b) ≥ f(c) − f(d).  As we have just demonstrated, this is, in view of Eq. A.1 and Eq. 
A.2 and the independence of the choices β,γ,β*,γ*, the same as the requirement that 
(s+σ:β) ~ (t+σ+ε:γ) imply (s+σ:β*) Ç (t+σ+ε:γ*) for all s,t,σ,ε as above.  That is, 
convexity of f is equivalent to more decreasing impatience for í* than for í.  
Reversing inequalities and weak preferences shows that concavity of f is equivalent to 
more increasing impatience for í* than for í.  · 
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FIGURE A.1.  Layout of the computer screen 
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